UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION
DOE V. SUNDQUIST
Case No. #3-96-0599
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
Part Two
Filed By: Tennessee Senator
Jim Holcomb, Tennessee Congressman Joe Fowlkes, Former Adoption Study
Commissioner Caprice East, and Former Adoption Study Commissioner Robert D.
Tuke.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITY
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Activities of the Adoption Study
Commission B. Actions of the General Assembly
ARGUMENT
I. TENNESSEE'S ADOPTION ACT
ACCOMPLISHES A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
MEANS
A. The Government Has a Compelling
Interest in Allowing Adult Adopted Persons Access to Their Adoption
Records
B. The Act Accomplishes Its Compelling
Interest Through the Least Restrictive Means
Brief Amicus
Curiae, Part Two:
II. THE ACT DOES NOT BREACH THE STATE'S ALLEGED CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION TO KEEP ADOPTION RECORDS SEALED EXCEPT BY ORDER OF THE COURT
III. THE ACT DOES NOT
INTERFERE WITH A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
A. The Act Does Not
Unconstitutionally Interfere With the Freedom to Make Familial and Reproductive
Choices
B. There Is No
Constitutional Guaranty of the Nondisclosure of Personal
Information
IV. THE ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
A. Pregnant Women Who
Chose to Place Their Children For Adoption Are Not a Suspect Class for Equal
Protection Purposes
B. There Is No
Government Selected Classification Which Burdens Plaintiffs' Fundamental
Constitutional Rights
V.
CONCLUSION
End Notes
II. THE ACT
DOES NOT BREACH THE STATE'S ALLEGED CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO KEEP ADOPTION
RECORDS SEALED EXCEPT BY ORDER OF THE COURT.
Plaintiffs allege that
some birth mothers might have relied upon a promise of confidentiality when they
placed their children for adoption. They argue that since the Act would
retroactively grant adult adopted persons access to portions of their adoption
records formerly unavailable except upon consent of the birth parent or court
order, the Act breaches the State's alleged contractual obligation to keep those
records sealed. As the testimony received by the Adoption Commission and the
General Assembly shows, State adoption procedures have never promised total
confidentiality to birth parents. Moreover, no promises of confidentiality were
made on the forms which birth mothers signed to surrender their parental rights.
Under the former law, adopted persons were permitted to have access to their
records at the court's discretion, a system which granted adopted persons access
to their records in an ad hoc and irregular manner. See Record of Adoption
Commission, Exhibits A and B to Affidavit of Caprice East. Indeed, in the
judicial procedure formerly in force, the biological parents received no notice
or opportunity to be heard and were entitled to no consideration on the question
of whether access should be permitted. Thus, any birth mother who decided to
place a child for adoption with the expectation of confidentiality, based her
decision on an unfounded and misguided belief. Any person or agency who
furthered such a belief without appropriate caveats most certainly misled the
biological parents.(1)
Furthermore, even if
Plaintiffs could convincingly demonstrate that birth parents had reliance
interests under the former statute, the legislature was fully within its rights
when it created a retroactive, remedial law. Under the Tennessee Constitution,
retroactive laws are generally prohibited. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 20. A
retroactive law "take[s] away or impair[s] vested rights acquired under existing
laws." Morris v. Gross, 572 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tenn. 1978). However, in Tennessee,
retroactive legislation is permitted when it is remedial in nature. Remedial
legislation provides the means or methods by which a cause of action maybe
effectuated, wrongs redressed, and relief obtained. Morford v. Yong Kyum Cho,
732 S.W.2d G17, 620 (Tenn. App. 1987). Although retroactive, the Act is remedial
because it provides a method by which relief may be obtained for adult adopted
persons who have been fighting for access to their adoption records under the
former law. Thus the Act is constitutional under Tennessee
law.
In addition, the Act is
constitutional under federal law. The United States Constitution does not
contain specific language prohibiting retroactive legislation. Rather,
retroactive legislation is prohibited under federal law when it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by interfering with listed constitutional
rights or with a right which the Supreme Court has determined to be an unlisted
fundamental right. Since Plaintiffs do not assert that the Act interferes with
the fundamental rights listed in the first eight amendments to the United States
Constitution, they must demonstrate that the Act infringes upon an unlisted
fundamental right, which is a right that the Supreme Court has found to be to be
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479. if Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the Act interferes with a fundamental
constitutional right, then their due process claim fails, taking Plaintiffs,
unconstitutional retroactive legislation claim along with
it.
III. THE ACT
DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Plaintiffs assert that
the Act interferes with birth parents' fundamental privacy rights under both the
Tennessee and United States Constitutions. The right to privacy can be
subdivided into two broad categories: (1) an interest in independence in making
certain kinds of decisions, and (2) an individual interest in avoiding the
disclosure of personal information. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). The
United States and Tennessee Supreme Courts have determined the first type of
privacy right to be a fundamental constitutional right in situations involving
certain familial and reproductive choices. Neither court has found the second
type, the right to the nondisclosure of personal information, to be a
constitutionally protected right.
A. The Act
Does Not Unconstitutionally Interfere With the Freedom to Make Familial and
Reproductive Choices
The Supreme Court has
recognized fundamental, constitutionally protected privacy rights in a series of
cases concerning government interference in decisions regarding marriage,
procreation, and child-rearing.(2) See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a similar "right to
procreational autonomy" under the Tennessee Constitution, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600
(Tenn. 1992).
\To bring the issue at
hand into the zone of constitutionally protected privacy created by the
foregoing line of cases, Plaintiffs argue that the Act interferes with the
freedom to make familial and reproductive choices. Plaintiffs attempt to prove
their point by linking open adoption and abortion. Specifically, Plaintiffs
allege that "because parents rely on anonymity when deciding whether to carry a
child to term and place it for adoption, the Act will cause more women to abort
their babies. (Pls. Memorandum in Support of Motion for a T.R.O., p.
10).
Plaintiffs, argument
that the Act will cause a decrease in adoptions and corresponding increase in
abortions is purely speculative. As evidence of a connection between open
adoption and abortion, Plaintiffs offer the following unsupported statistics:
"Open adoption has resulted in a 51 percent decrease in adoptions in Australia
in the last five years since similar legislation took effect, and a 67 percent
decrease in Great Britain over the last ten years." (Pls. Am. Compl. P 23).
Plaintiffs give no citation for their statistical allegations, but even if they
were true, the numbers still do not demonstrate a causal link between open
adoptions and abortion. Australian and English government records indicate a
pattern of decline in adoption rates which began in 1973 and 1969, respectively,
long before open adoption legislation was enacted in either country. In fact,
the actual data available from those countries indicates that the effect, if
any, of opening adoption records was to reduce the rate of decline of adoptions.
See Affidavit of Frederick F. Greenman, filed in this cause and attached
hereto.
In any event, a decline
in adoptions which began eight or eighteen years before records were unsealed
cannot logically be attributed to the laws which, unsealed those records.
Indeed, the decline in adoptions since around 1970 may just as easily, and
perhaps more logically, be attributed to the increased availability of various
forms of birth control, growing social acceptance of single motherhood, and
increased government support of single mothers, all of which coincided with the
onset of declining adoption rates. Plaintiffs also cite three state court
decisions from the 1970's which in dicta speculate about a connection between
abortion and open adoption. Again, these speculations are unsubstantiated by any
hard evidence which establishes a connection between open adoption and declining
adoption rates due to abortion. Thus Plaintiffs' argument in this area is
unfounded and speculative.(3)
Even if Plaintiffs could
demonstrate a causal connection between allowing adult adopted persons access to
their adoption records and declining adoption and increasing abortion rates,
their argument would still lack legal merit. Unlike the right to decide,
independent of government interference, to have an abortion, marry, use
contraception, or send one's children to a religious school, the alleged right
to place a child for adoption with the assurance that the adoption record would
remain sealed has never been deemed a constitutionally protected right by either
the United States Supreme Court or the Tennessee Supreme
Court.
The decision to place a
child for adoption is no doubt a profoundly personal decision. But the Act
neither mandates that women surrender children for adoption nor forbids them to
do so. In fact, the Act was in no way intended to interfere with a woman's
decision with respect to adoption. Although the Plaintiffs speculate that the
new adoption records procedure may factor into some women's decisions about
placing a child for adoption, this speculated interference does not rise to
constitutional proportions. Moreover, Plaintiffs, speculation that "open"
adoption inhibits women from placing their children has been directly refuted by
at least one expert in the adoption counseling field who has filed an affidavit
in this cause. See Affidavit of Deborah Robinson attached
hereto.
As the Supreme Court has
written, "Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy
to some degree. The question in each case is whether that interference violates
a command of the United States Constitution." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967) . The Act does not prohibit adoption. Thus it is unimaginable
that the Supreme Court would find that the Act is analogous to the government
interference in private decisions on par with laws that criminalize abortion,
Roe, 410 U.S. 113; prohibit interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1; outlaw married couples, use of contraceptives, Griswald v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479; or forbid children's attendance at parochial schools, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. Furthermore, the evidence considered by the
Adoption Commission and the General Assembly, and submitted to this court,
indicates that because the Act makes the adoption process fairer to all the
parties involved, it may actually lead to an increase in adoptions. See
Affidavit of Deborah Robinson, supra.
B. There Is No
Constitutional Guaranty of the Nondisclosure of Personal Information
Plaintiffs next allege
that since the Act would allow adult adopted persons access to their adoption f
files, and necessarily to information regarding their birth parents, it
interferes with birth parents' "right to privacy," specifically their alleged
right to the nondisclosure of "personal information" and is therefore
unconstitutional. But the disclosure at issue is not to the public, but to the
birth parent's own adult child, and the principal "personal information"
disclosed is the identity of that child's parent. Neither the statute nor the
constitution (United States or Tennessee) has ever made that information private
from the child. Paternity proceedings are ancient; their constitutionality has
never been questioned. Prior Tennessee adoption law directed courts to release
the parent's information whenever release was in the best interest of the
adopted person. Former T.C.A § 36-1-131(a). No court has ever found that parents
have a constitutional right to conceal their identities from their children. If
there were such a right, both paternity actions and former T.C.A.§ 36-1-131
would have been unconstitutional.
Indeed, neither the
Tennessee nor the United States Constitution recognizes a specific right to the
nondisclosure of personal information. Therefore, Plaintiffs, claim to such a
right is without merit. Plaintiffs cite the United States Supreme Court's
observation in Roe v. Whalen that a person has "an individual interest in
avoiding the disclosure of personal matters," 429 U.S. at 599, as support for
the proposition that there is a constitutional right to the nondisclosure of
personal information. In fact, while the Whalen Court might have recognized an
individual interest in the nondisclosure of personal matters, it held that such
an interest did not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right. Id.
at G04 (holding that a New York law which required that prescriptions of certain
drugs be written in triplicate and reported to a state registry was
constitutional) The Court further noted that:
[Although the
Constitution affords protection against certain kinds of government intrusions
into personal and private matters, there is 'no general constitutional right to
privacy, ... [The protection of a person's general right to privacy... is, like
the protection of his property and his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual states."' Id. at 607-08 (J. Stewart concurring, citing Katz, 389 U.S.
at 350-51). In addition, in J.P. v. Desanti, the Sixth Circuit held that the
United States Constitution does not encompass a right to the nondisclosure of
personal information. 653 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1981). The court in
Desanti specifically held, in the context of a claim to a constitutional right
to nondisclosure of juvenile court records, that the right to privacy under the
Constitution was restricted to "those personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental, or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'" and the
safeguards against the nondisclosure of private information "must be left to the
states or the legislative process." Id. at 1090-91. The Sixth Circuit recently
reaffirms its Desanti opinion in Doe v. Wigginton. 21 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1994).
Thus, the Plaintiffs, claim that the Act violates birth parents, federal
constitutionally protected "right to privacy" fails.
Plaintiffs, rights under
the Tennessee Constitution are similar to those under the United States
Constitution. In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a right
to privacy in matters of "procreational autonomy," 842 S.W.2d at 600, much like
the zone of privacy in reproductive decision-making the Court found in Roe and
Griswald. Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court has never held that a general
right to privacy extends to the nondisclosure of personal information, and any
determination of such rights has been left to the legislature. Thus, under the
Tennessee Constitution, there is no right to the nondisclosure of personal
information, and Plaintiffs' claim under the Tennessee Constitution necessarily
fails.
IV. THE ACT
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Plaintiffs contend that
the Act violates their equal protection rights. Again, their argument is obscure
since Plaintiffs have not briefed this cause of action. Presumably, plaintiffs
contend that the Act discriminates against the class of pregnant women who place
their children for adoption as compared to the class of pregnant women who
choose to have an abortion. Apparently, they reason that if adult children of
members of the former class have access to parts of their adoption records when
they are twenty-one, and necessarily information regarding their birth mothers,
then some members of the former class might feel their privacy has been invaded,
whereas as members of the latter class will have no adult children who might
someday access their adoption records.
To be successful in
their equal protection claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that either (1) they
have been burdened by a state action because they are members of a suspect class
or (2) that their fundamental constitutional rights have been burdened because
they are a member of a government selected classification.
A. Pregnant
Women Who Chose to Place Their Children For Adoption Are Not a Suspect Class for
Equal Protection Purposes
To cause this court to
apply strict scrutiny to the Act the Plaintiffs must establish that pregnant
women who place their children for adoption are members of a suspect class. So
far, the only suspect classes the Supreme Court has identified have been classed
based on race and national origin.(4) City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S.
469 (1989). Since birth mothers are not a category based on race or national
origin, and they have not been singled out for deprivation of their
constitutional rights under color of state law, they are not a suspect class.
Therefore, they are not entitled to demand strict scrutiny of the
Act.
Plaintiffs may
alternatively argue that birth mothers are a "semi-suspect" class. Even if this
claim were successful, semisuspect classes only merit middle-level scrutiny. To
survive middle-level scrutiny, the government need only demonstrate that the
classification be "substantially" related to the achievement of "important"
government objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) . The Act would
survive middle-level scrutiny because making adoption records available to adult
adopted persons is substantially related to the important government objective
of instituting adoption procedures which are fair to all the parties involved.
Therefore, Plaintiffs, claim would fail under this argument as
well.
B. There Is No
Government Selected Classification Which Burdens Plaintiffs Fundamental
Constitutional Rights
If a classification
burdens a fundamental right, the Court applies strict scrutiny regardless of the
characteristics of the people who are burdened. The Court has only recognized
fundamental rights for equal protection purposes in certain limited
circumstances, however, including: (1) the right to vote, see e.g. Harper v.
Virginia Board of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1963) (2) the right to have access to
the court, see e.g. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; and (3) the right
of interstate migration, see e.g. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Since the alleged right to have adoption records sealed except by court order
has not been recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right for equal
protection purposes, Plaintiffs, equal protection claim is without
merit.
V.
CONCLUSION. Adoption was unknown at
common law and is a purely statutory creation. Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of
Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 648 (1977) . Courts have long granted state
legislatures broad deference when reviewing adoption laws. In the past, this
broad deference upheld the constitutionality of sealed adoption record laws.
ALMA Society v. Mellon, 601 F. 2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979) ; In re Assalone , 512 A.
2d 1383 (R.I. 1986) ; Bradley v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d
418 (S.C. 1981); Mills, 327 A.2d 646. These cases hold that it is for the
legislatures to balance the interests of birth parents and adopted persons who
want disclosure and those who do not. E.g., Assalone, 512 A.2d at 1390. No case
has ever suggested that the United States Constitution requires any legislation
to seal adoption records.
Tennessee should be
granted the same broad deference in the court's review of the Act. The revised
adoption laws do not breach a contractual obligation of the State, nor do they
violate any rights which are fundamental for either due process or equal
protection purposes. Furthermore, the Act accomplishes a compelling state
interest through the least restrictive means. The States are to be granted broad
latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to social problems. Whalen,
429 U.S. at 597. In the words of Justice Brandeis: "To stay experimentation
in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the of the
right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences for the Nation. It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (dissenting opinion)." Tennessee chose to serve as such a laboratory
when it undertook to enact adoption legislation which more fairly balances the
interests of all the parties involved in adoptions. In doing so, the General
Assembly acted completely within its powers, and the resulting statute is fully
constitutional.
Respectfully
submitted, Robert D. Tuke TUKE YOPP & SWEENEY Suite 1100,
NationsBank Plaza 414 Union Street Nashville TN 37219 (615)
313-3300 Counsel for Amicus Curiae
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